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World War I brought many new advances in technology to
the world. These new technologies brought new methods to
warfare and changed the way wars were fought forever. They
introduced many new aspects to the battl-es fought during
the war, and most of t.hese technologies added to the
effici-ency of Lhe killing of the troops fighting the war.
One of the most. feared technol-ogies that were
developed during World War I was chemical weaponry. This
new technology proved t.o be very effici-ent during the war,
and continually instilled fear in the troops fighting the
war. The physical effect.s caused by the weapons were
devastating to the troops. Many considered exposure to the
weapons a fate worse then death because of the immense pain
caused. The physical pain caused by the weapons during
battles was only a part of the anguish caused by the
chemical weapons. The ignorance among the troops about the
weapons also added to the overall effect.s of the weapons
during the war.
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The development of these weapons constj-tuted much of
the technologlcal advances during the war by both sides.
Thousands of different chemicals were being tested during
the pre and early war years for their effectiveness against
opposing armies. Many of these ehemicals were already being
produced in massive quantities for civilian use and were
transformed into weapons during this time.
fn this paper I will show t.wo of the major changes due
to the use of chemical weapons during World War I. The
first being the tactical change brought because of the
weapons. I will show this aspect through looking at the
first battle where chemical weapons were used. I will also
illustrate the advancement in the methods of deployment and
the importance they had on the effectiveness of the
weapons. I will show the different approaches, both
offensive and defensive, to chemj-ca1 warfare by the
opposing sides of the war.
The second aspect I will- explore is the ethical
decisions made about. usi-ng the weapons during the war. Many
of the ehemical companies made huge profits duri-ng the war
years because of the production of the weapons and they
gained from the deaths of thousands of troops. The armies
deploying the weapons also saw the horrifying physical and
devastating menLal conditions caused by the weapons,
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however the use of the weapons was continual throughout the
war. fn response to the weapons being used the development
of the gas mask was the most evident defensive measure
taken during the war, and the gas mask represented an
ethical choice of protection for the troops. The gas mask
also introduced a tactical change to the war because of the
ineffecti-veness of many of the gases used.
By using a topical approach I will show these
different elements to illust.rate the impact of chemical
weapons during the war.
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The Tactical Change Through the Battle at Ypres
The war brought many of the new technologies from the
laboratory and test,ing process Lo the battlefield. Chemical
weapons were among these new weapons. The battle at Ypres
in 1915 was the first time these weapons were unleashed on
the soldiers during the war. Up until- this time the
milit.ary leaders on bot.h sj-des of t.he war were skeptical
about using chemical weapons. According to Marshall, the
Germans had prepared for the use of the weapons by a
constant carronade for the two previous days.1
The devastation caused by the gas at the battle at
Ypres, both physical and tactical, was important to the
further use of the weapons during the war. Martin Gilbert
has noted that. the use of the chemical weapons was
devastating.2 He states further that when the chemicals were
released it made many of Lhe men get into comatose and
dying positions.3 This changed tactics in battle for the
rest of the war.
The Battle at Ypres that took place on April 22, 19L5
was the first instance in World War I where chemical
' S.L.A Marshall, The American Heritage History of World War I. Washington D.C.: (American Heritage
Publications, 1964), pp. 106.
2 Martin Gilbert, The First World War. (New York: Holt and Company, 1994),pp. 144.
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weapons played a key rol-e in how the battl-e was fought.
From there on the way the war was fought changed. Love
states that, "Gas was often a double-edged sword capable of
blowing back to its point of origin..."  Marshall and Hart
also suggested that the use of chemical weapons at Ypres
made an impact. that changed. the rest of the war. However
Marshall also maintains that the change was not as
effective as the armies had hoped.t The development of the
gas mask helped the armies on both sides all-eviate the
problems with gas.
As the sun set over the battlefield of Ypres in
northern France the A11ied troops began to sme1l a
"devilish j-ncense" and they had no idea what horror had
just been released on them.t The fog was a greenish-ye1low
haze that crept along the ground into the trenches. The gas
quickly covered two French divisions and the men began to
feel the immediate effects of Chlorine gas poisoning. The
bombardment only lasted 15 minutes, but unleashed the gas
on the men.'The gas quickly made t.he men ineffective and
this opened a breach in the northern flank for the Germans
to exploit. Gilbert maintains that this caused a four
'Gilbert, pp.l44.
o Dare Love, Trenches on the Web, "The Second Battle of Ypresd,"
http://www.worldwarl .com/sf2ypres.html, 199 6.
5 Marshall, pp. 107.
6 Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, The Real War 1914-1918, (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1930), pp.175
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hundred yard gap in the allied l-ines and t.his created a
huge tactical advantage for the Germans.t t<eith Robbins
states that the Germans were not as hesitant to use the
9ds, however the A1lies were most apprehensive.e The other
divisions that made up the front and south flanks were
Canadian troops, and the Germans could easily begin pushing
back the remaining forces. Most of Lhe Canadian and British
troops escaped from t.he gas, but the French suffered major
losses.
The battle at Ypres raises many questions for
historians. Why did the gas come as such a surprise from
the Germans? How did the British troops make it out with
very few casualties when the French suffered massive
casualties?
Liddell Hart suggests one interpretation that German
prisoners taken near the end of March of 1915 told the
commanders about. the cylinders of gas and how they were
going to be deployed. The British and the Canadian forces
took the information under advisement, but the French
commanders didn't pay much attention to it.10 The French did
notify some of the field commanders, but made no official
warning available t.o Lhe troops.
7 Marshall, 107.
8 Gilbert, pp.l44.
n Robbins, Keith, The First World War. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 46.
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Gas weapons had been banned at the Hague conference."
The Hague Conference itself was set up to look at the way
the war was fought. One of the main jobs of the conference
was to look at the effects of the weapons. The Hague
conference set many new laws for warfare, known as the
Hague Laws." The Hague outlawed many of the weapons
including chemical weapons.
The New York Tribune ran a series of stories on the
battle at Ypres, and it. was very clear they made the
Germans look extremely barbaric. The paper explained and
justified this attitude because of the banning at the Hague
conference. The article also shows how many didn't know
what to expect because gas was such a new weapon. One of
the article states, rrThe gaseous vapor which the Germans
used against the French divisions near Ypres last Thursday,
contrary to the rules of the Hague Convention, introduces a
new element into warfare."13
The Germans had 57oo cyli.nders worth of chlorine gas.
These cylinders were the first form of dispersion, and they
were very effective because of the way it released the gas.
to Hart, pp. 177
ll Love, pp.4
'2 Michaii E Reisman, and Chris T. Antoniou (editors), The Laws of War: A Comprehensive Collection of
Primary Documents on International Laws Governing Armed Conflict. (New York: Random House, 1994),
pg.xxi.
iiWltt Irwin, "The Use of Poison Gas", The New York Tribune , 27 Apt',l l9l 5, pg. 2 (online at website:
http://www.lib.byu.edr.r/-rdh/wwil1 9 I S/chlorsas.htrnl).
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The dispersing of the gas was planned to be immediately
followed by a bombardment of artillery she11s, and strong
infantry assaults. The Germans knew with the soldiers
stunned they could move forward quickly. The gas was
dispersed from the large canisters only feet in front of
the German trenches. Along wiLh the devastating effects of
t.he gas, Love also points out that because the German gas
moved closely to the ground many of the French, British,
and Canadian troops were forced out in the open where they
could be shot by the German infantry.la
This use of the gas shows how it changed the way the
battles were fought. The use of gas could not only
immobilize the soldiers, but also draw them out from behind
their cover. If the men chose to stay in the trenches they
would have to face the effects of the gas. Many of the men
who chose Lo remain in the trenches at Ypres died of
suffocat.ion. Even though most of the Canadian forces were
able to escape from Ypres with their lives, nearly the
entire L't Canadian division lost their lives from the gas.
After the first night of the battle, the breach left
open by the French divisions that were devastated the day
before meant that the Canadian troops had to go in and hold
the Germans back. The Germans had advanced during the
la Love, pp.4
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night. This t.ime t.he troops would be f ighting in a forest
instead of an open fie1d. The hope by the Al1ied commanders
was that the gas couldn't float freely through the trees,
like it had on the field. However, knowing t.he gas would
not be as effective in the forest the Germans commanders
planned to force an assault using artillery and infantry.
This shows a massive change in the tactj-cs used by the
German army d.uring the battle. The canadians held the
ground, until the next day when a breeze was able to carry
the gas t.o Lhe alIied trenches.ls Some of t.he Canadian
troops tried to prepare for the gas using dampened gauze,
however this only aLlowed the soldiers to function to a
short extent and eventually they had to pulI back. Even
t.hough the gauze helped the men they did not keep the
effects of the gas ouL, and many of the men who survived
had respiratory-related health problems for the rest of
their lives.
The 1"t Canadian division had 228 men that were injured
by the 9ds, however of the men that did not die, Love
illust.rates that gas diminished their ability to fight and
was a considerable facLor to why they died aL Ypres.16 Many
of the men could not resist t.he urge to rip off the sma1l
15 Love, pp. 6
16 Love, pp. 7
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gauze they had covering their face to try and gasp for more
air, and it is believed the German troops advanced quickly
and fired from less then 100 yards. By the end of the
battle at Ypres the Canadians had lost 5,975 men out of
18,000 in t.he division.
After Lhe battle the Germans did not t.ake fuII
advantage of the new weapons. Many hj-storians I have
discussed like Marshall and Gilbert see Ypres as the
testing ground for the new weapons, because they had never
been tried before in battIe.17 If the Germans had continued
to move south they could have cut off over 50,000 Canadian
and British troops. The Bat.tl-e at Ypres was the worst one
faced by the Canadian troops during the war. Much of the
information that. Love uses throughout. his appraisal of the
batLle is f rom Canadian histori-ans. Other historians like
Gilbert and Robbins also recount the other loses of troops
by the French and British, it is clear the use of gas at
Ypres was devastatJ-ng physically t,o the f orces there.
One of the themes about the gas warfare thaE. most of
the historians like Gilbert, Robbins, Hart, and Marshall
agree on is that the wind on the battlefield must be
f avorable f or the gas to be ef f ective. "...The attack was
postponed repeatedly for favorable wind, and t.he attack
t2
plan had to be adjusted This meant the battle of ypres
also acted as a testing ground for the cyli-nders containing
the gas, ds r will discuss next in the deployment sectj-on.
It also was clear that to equalize the battlefield with
chemical weapons the allj-es would have to put more
concentration on developing a new gas mask.
The battle of Ypres was the first of many battles in
the First world war that were impacted tremendously by the
use of chemical warfare. The battlefield at ypres was the
site of three more battles itself before the end of t.he
war. The tactj-cs of fighting the war were changing for both
sides and it was clear t.hat the new chemical weapons could
be advanced into somethj.ng much more devastating. A11 of
the sources that r have cited have shown that the use of
the weapons at Ypres began a change in tactics in the war.
Gilbert makes it clear, however, that whire the creation of
the gas mask put a stop to many of the effects of the gas,
the symptoms were never totally al1eviated.1e They sti11
made an impact on the soldiers physically, and with the
advent of Mustard gas the tactics in battre were changed..
17 Marshall, pp. 107.
It Hart, pp. 178
t'Gilbert, pp.146.
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Deployment and Ear1y Development of Chemical
Weapons
The battle at Ypres saw the use of many new chemical
weapons that were very new technologies. Before the war
many of the chemicals that would eventually see the
battlefieLd were being used in households around Lhe world.
The chemical industry was very new, and most of the
chemj-cals being designed were for household or industrial
use.'o For instance chlorine was used in different cleaning
chemicals. When the war came along many of the different
chemical companies saw their chance to capitalize on
chemical weapons, even though most were banned at the Hague
convention, as I discussed in the previous section. fn Lhe
early days of World War I chemical weapons were still in
the laboratory, and much of t.he military spending and
coneentration went to the development of these weapons
Both sides of the war were developing their own new
chemical weapons. Unlike the development that took place
for the gas mask, which was mainly defensj-ve, the
development of the different tlpes of deployment methods
was for offensive warfare. The first army to actually take
20 L"o P. Brophy, Wyndham D. Miles, and Rexmond C. Cochrane, The Chemical Warfare Service:
From Laboratory to Field. (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1959), pp. 13.
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the weapons from the laboratory to the field was the German
army. However, the Al-lies were developing their own
weapons. These new toxic agents included Phosgene, Hydrogen
Cyanide, Cyanogen Chloride, Lewisite, Nitrogen Mustards,
and Must.ard Gas. A11 of these dif ferent tlpes of chemicals
had differenL effecLs on the human body, and I will go into
more detail about the effects in a later section. These
chemical weapons were effective in different ways, and all
of them became useful t.hroughout the war. There were over
3,000 different chemicals being researched by scientists
for their use in weapooty, however only thirty ever saw
battle, and even fewer were desired by the military in
following wars. Many of the chemicals didn't have the
combat effectiveness desired by the different armies. The
effectiveness was judged on the speed by which it affected
the troops, and the physical effects it had.21
Much of the concentration of the development of the
weapons went to the deployment of the weapons. The
deployment was an important factor because it decided what
terrain the weapons could be used on, and how much of a
factor the wind would be when they were deployed.
" A.M. Pappenheimer, "section II Clinical Features," The Medical Department Of the United States
Army in the World War, In main author (fust in the list) put his name and then et al. Medical Aspects
of Gas Warfare, vol. 14. The Medical Deparftnent of the Army in the World War. (Washington D.C.:
Govemment Printing Office, 1926), pp. 88.
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Throughout peacetime after the war and during the Seeond
World War the United States development of these weapons
was constant, however these programs started during the
World V{ar I. The production remained constant because after
the effectiveness seen in World War I the weapons could be
used even more effect.ively in World War II.
In 1899, many of the dj.fferent countries around the
world met at the Hague Conference. One of the main concerns
during t.he conference was the use of asphyxiatlng gas in
sheIIs." The united States proved to be one of the
strongest objectors to the new chemical weapons. Historian
Charles Heller explains the strong objections to chemical
weapons by the United States because of the effect.s of Lhe
weapons. Most of the weapons of war used were brutal enough
t,he United States government felt the use of these weapons
would cause too much agony and horrible pain of the
soldiers fighting the war.23 Chemical weapons were also an
extremely new technology, and the United Stat.es was very
apprehensive about using them. The main American groups
against the use of chemical weapons included policy makers,
military leaders, and peace advocates. Each had their own
reasons for their opposition, but all of them wanted the
t6
same things dealing with chemical weapons, which was their
non-use during the war
Even though the United States was very much against
the use of the weapons, this did not stop many of the other
counties from talking about the development of their own
weapons. Later I will discuss t.he dif ferenL laws writ.ten at
the Hague Conference, buL even the laws written at Hague
didn't stop many countries from their production of t.he
weapons.2a Many of the countries began developing their own
weapons because they knew some countries wouldn't fo11ow
the Hague 1aws. France for instance was a country that
publicly developed its own chemical weapons before World
War I. France was the first country to openly develop the
first gas fi11ed grenade; t.he grenade itself was a new
technology in 1913 and 1914, and adding this new twist to
it only made it that much more terrible. The Germans were
also developing chemicals during t.his time, however this
research was a mainly done outside of the military, for
industrial and household use. At. the beginning of the war
however, the Germans saw the effectiveness of these weapons
" Mui.@) Charles E Heller, Leavenworth Paoers: Chemical Warfare in World War I: The American
Experience. 1917-1918. (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1984), pp.3.ffi
2a Michael E Reisman, and Chris T. Antoniou (editors), The Laws of War: A Cornprehensive Collection of
Primar.v Documents on International Laws Governine Armed Conflict. (New York: Random House, 1994),
pp.83.
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in trench style warfare. Many of the army policy makers on
both sides of the war saw the indecisiveness of trench
warfare, and a deadlock had been reached on the Western
Front by late Lgl-4." Other historians tike Martin Gj-lbert
and Donald Richt.er maintain that trench warfare was one of
t.he many reason for the first use of chemical weapons by
the Germans during the war.26
The different leaders of the warring nati-ons wanted to
get back to the mobilized style of warfare. The different
armies conceived many different t)pes of alternative
tactics and strategies. For instance the British looked at
new bombing methods to overrun German positions to help
relieve the stalemate. The first battle of Ypres saw this
method work for the Germans. The different bombardment
methods included long range cannon shelling and massive
offensive runs by the different troops to overrun the
German positions. Most of these strategies failed, and the
Germans were making their own plans for an of fensive. ,fohn
Keegan and S.L.A. Marshall- also say the stalemate caused by
the trench warfare was also the reason for the massive
development and advancement of the tank in World War T.27
" Heller, pp. 83.
25 Richter, pp. 12
'u Heller, pp. 83.
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The German solution involved the use of chemi-caI
warfare. The Germans, seeing the shortcomings of the French
developed grenades, decided to take another approach using
artiLlery she1Is. The German High Command first decided to
use "T-She11s" on the Eastern Front on ,January 31"t 1915.28
"T-Shells" were a new type of artillery developed by the
British; their purpose was to act like clalrmores, showering
shrapnel all over the opposing army." The German officers
were surprised to find the weapons were not as effective as
they had hoped. The cold weather had neutralized the
chemical agent used in the shells.
The Germans then wanted to find new and more effective
ways to deploy t.he gas. The German High Command then looked
t.o Professor Fritz Haber, to find a new way of dep1oyment.30
Haber, believed that the "T-She11s" did not. provide a high
enough concenLration of chemicals. He then suggested the
use of large commercial gas cylinders as a delivery system.
Haber sai-d these canisters had two big advantages over the
"T-Shef1s." The first was the amount of gas that could be
deployed and the second was that the cylinders didn't break
the agreements reached. at the Hague conference.3t The Hague
Conference put forth many bans on certain weapons to be
2E Heuer, 7.
" Keith Robbins, The First World War. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 102.
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used during the war. These included chemical weapons.
However, the laws only outlawed liquid chemicals from hoses
and not the gas warfare used by the Germans. In the first
and Second Hague accords limited the use of the different
chemicals in the war, these included Chlorine and Phosgene.
They also outlawed the development of new chemicals
strictly for warfare purposes." However, by the beglnning
of the war several amendment.s had been added to the laws
made at Hague.
The first gas that was recommended by the industries
in Germany for the army to use in the war was chlorine. It
was already manufactured in large quantiti-es for commercial
use, and was very effective against the opposing armj-es.
Chlorine met all of the military requirements: it was
l-ethal and affected the opposing army immediately."
The gas from these cylinders was very effective for
many different reasons. World War I was the first war where
trench warfare was widely used. This Literally meant Lhe
opposing arrnies were in dug out trenches noL far apart from
each ot.her. In many instances the trenches were only five
meters apart. The gas coming from these containers would
30 Heller, 7.
3l Heller,7.
32 The Hague Peace Conftren
University in the year of 1908, (New York: Garland Publishers, 1972),pp.159.
33 Heller, 7.
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stay close to the ground and seep into the trenches almost
immediately. The gases were released from \rfox" holes and
brought to the surface by long lead pipes. These gases
could be used on almost any battlefield whether it was
woods, underbrush, ravines-trenches, or dugouts.3a
These cylinders were extremely effective at deploying
the gas, however the first large canisters proved to have
many problems. The most obvious problem with the canisters
was the size and weight of them. The soldiers could not
move the heawy canisters themselves because most of the
canisters weighed cl-ose to one hundred and fifty pounds.
Another problem wit.h the canisters was if any tlpe of fire
hit them they could potentially explode and cause mass
casualties for the troops deploying them.3s The canisters
were so immobile that new ways of deployment of the gas had
to found. Another big problem with the canisters was wind
speed and dlrection played a big role in how effective the
deployment was.
The armies on both sides including Germany and
Britain then looked back to artillery as a tlpe of
deployment. Mortars, grenades, and land mines were all
developed as gas weapons. By 19L7 and 1918 t.he development
3a Heller, 14.
35 Leo P Brophy, Wyndham D. Miles, and Rexmond C. Cochrane, The Chemical Warfare Service: From
Laboratory to Field. (Washington D.C.: Departrnent of the Army, 1959,), pp. 165.
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of toxic gases had branched out into the development of
incendiary weapons." rncendiary weapons are those that
produce an extremely high-leve1 heat or fire as a weapon-
After World War I the development of the flame-thrower came
from this early work on incendiary weapons. The British
were the first to develop the gas mortars used during the
war. The British developed a new delivery system from the
mortars ca1led "shots." The mortars were soon adopted by
the United States and the 4.s-inch chemical mortar was
developed by July 191-8.3' This is clearly the evolution of
the different deployment systems of the chemj-ca1 weapons
during the war.
The first regiment in the British army to use mortars
the Gas Warfare Service (GWS), was established in L9l-8 and
they also used a British-designed Stokes mortar.38 It was
desi-gned to shoot very high into the air at an extremely
high velocity, and then used momentum to bring itself back
to earth. These mortars took the problem of wind speed and
direction out of the equation, and thls form of deplo)rment
became the one most used. However the accuracy of these
mortars was not very good, and this caused problems for





st.rategies being developed for chemj-ca} weapons had to be
adj usted .
Over half of the gas weapon attacks took place at
night.3e To help warn the soldiers about the gas attacks
during the night different warning systems were set up. The
alarms themselves were special sirens that were thought to
be very effective. These alarms had the intention of
allowing the soldiers to get their safety gear on before
the gas mad.e it to them. Yet. of all t.he soldiers asked
about the alarms just over half of them said they heard the
alarms.no This system was mainly a defensive approach by the
AlIies.
of the thirty different chemicals used during Lhe war
only about a dozen were ever desired by the military. The
chemi-ca1s were many times grouped by the different effects
they had on the human body. These different chemicals
caused many different devastating effect.s to the human
body, which I will illustrate in a later sectj-on. without
protection the gas affected virtually every soldier,
depending of what type of gas was being used. However along
with the development of the weapons came the defensive
equipment with urays to protect the soldi-ers from the gas.




fn l-918 between 20 and 30 percent of all American
casualties were from gas weapons. This number was cut down
to 3 to 4 percent after the widespread use of gas masks.al
By the t,ime the gas mask had been advanced from it first
conception to a very effective defensive tool in l-ate L9l7
the war was almost over. However this laid the groundwork
for masks used in subsequent wars.
at Benedict Crowell, America's Munitions 1917-1918. (Washington D.C.: Govemment Printing Office,
t9t9),496.
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Different Trrpes of Chemicals Weapons and Phrreical
Effects of Gas Weapons
As I have i-llustrated in the previous sections, the
chemical_ industry was a developing indust.ry during the
years leading to Worl-d War I. Many of the different
chemicals used in the gas weapons were developed only a few
years before the war. Many different chemical companies saw
tremendous growth during the war years and many of the
companies such as Du Pont made a tremendous amount of money
from the production of chemical weapons- Many of the
chemical weapons used. are chemical-s commonly used today.
For instance the chlorine was one of the main chemicals
used during the war, and today it is used in many different
cleansers, and in pool care, even though it is now in a
very different form.
The different chemi_cals being developed at this time
had many effects on the soldiers on which they were
deployed. Researchers on bot.h sides of the war were also
developing different chemical weapons, and each saw the
potential for devastation from chemical weapons. These
weapons could be deployed against apposing armies, and
cause massive suffering and death. Their different effects
25
on the human body categorized the weapons from both sides.
These categories ineluded eye irritants, lung irritants,
nasal irritants, and skin irrj-Lants.a2 Some of the gases fit
j-nto more then one of the categories, however this proved
to be the best way of categorization.
Eye iritants were gases that. mainly affected the eyes
of the troops and caused many different symptoms.






-Dichloret hyl sulphide (Mustard Gas) a3
Some of the effects of these gases would be
instantaneous and others took hours or even days to
surface. The eye irritants had several different effects on
the eye. Many of the weapons felt like a sharp blow to the
eyes, acting much like the mace or tear gas of today, even
if the exposure was very limited. Most soldiers found the
pain almost instantly unbearable.nt other effects that eye
irriLants could also cause severe damage to the cornea, and
in many cases prolonged exposure could cause blindness.
o' L.F. Haber, The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War. (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1986), pp. 52.
a3 Captain H.C. Bradley, "section II Clinical Features," The Medical Department Of the United States
Army in the World War, Medical Aspects of Gas Warfare, vol. 14, The Medical Departrnent of the Army
in the World War (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1926), pp. 81.
e Bradley, pp. 82.
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Most of the chemicals stimulated the tear ducts, and
massive amounts of tears would be produced, making the
soldiers almost completely b1ind. Most of the eye irritants
also damaged the tissue around the eye. Most eye irritanL
gases were felt immediately by troops when they were
exposed to the gas.nt xy1yI Bromide was a very popular
tearing agent because it was easily made ln a brewi-ng
process. Most of the chemicals were made through long
processes and requj-red special facilities, however the
process to produce Xylyl Bromide was extremely simple
compared to the production of many of the other chemicals
used. a5
Even though eye irritants caused massive damage to the
soldiers, they were not considered the most effective
chemical weapons available. Lung irritants proved to be the
most effeetive way to neuLralize troops. Lung irritants
caused a large number of the deaths from chemical weapons.n'
The most well known gas of the lung irritant gases in World
War I was ehlorine gas. However, there were several other
lung irritants used in the war. These chemicals included:
-Chlorine, Bromide
-Phosgene










Chl-orine has been used throughout Lhe history of
warfare and was not new to World War I. However, World War
f was the first time this weapon was used on a very large,
strat.egic military sca1e. Most of the previous instances of
chlorine use were isolated, however the information on
Lhese instances is limited because most were not recorded.
Chlorine is a highly effective reactive agent. ft, like
most other chemical weapons causes irritation and kills
tissue. Chlorine is very effective because it causes an
instantaneous reaction in the respiratory system. It
immediately attacks the system, causing massive coughing
spasms, and many times violent vomiting. It also destroys
all of the tissue inside the 1ung, mainly the lj-ning, and
in most cases the damage caused by lung irritants is
i-rreversible and sometimes fatal.n'The chemical reaction is
caused when the chemical is mixed with the moisture from
the respiratory system or the eyes and produces
hydrochtorj-c aeid in the lung. so
Chloropi-crin has many of the same effects chlorine gas
does, such as severe coughing and violent retching- The
a8 Bradley, pp. 83
ae Bradley, pp. 83
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main difference between the two is that instead of an
instantaneous reaction that is found in chlorine,
Chloropicrin has a delayed reaction. Chloropicrin also
causes massive liver damage.sl
Even though it is not the most. well known, phosgene is
considered to be the most effective lung irritant. When the
troops were first exposed to phosgene gas it caused an
immediate gripping feeling within the chest. This effect
passes rather quickly, but it is very effective in stunning
troops for a short time. When the chemicals stunned the
troops they could not fight against the opposing army
because of the tremendous physical effects they caused.
Sometime after the exposure it then causes massive damage
to the lungs and respiratory system. Many of the effects of
phosgene are t.he same as chlorine, but on a much more
intensified Ievel. Phosgene was one of the most widely used
lung irrit.ants in World War I . s2
Another type of irrltant much like the lung irritants
was the nasal irritant chemicals. These nasal irritants had
many of the Same effects as the lung irritants, however in
many cases the chemicals were not in gas form. Many of the
to A.M. Pappenheimer, "section II Clinical Features," The Medical Department Of the United States Army
in the World War, Medical Aspects of Gas Warfare, vol. 14, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1926),pp.l2A.
5t Bradley, pp. 83.
s2 Bradley, pp. 84.
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nasal- irritant.s came in the form of smoke instead of gases.
The most common effect of these different smokes was to
make breathing much more difficult. for those affected by
them. Instead. of mai-nly affecting the 1ungs, Lhe different
smokes irritated the mouth, nose and throat. One of the
most common of these smokes was phenychlorasin. ft caused
violent coughing and sneezing atLacks, sometimes for
hours.s3 The smokes were not very effective during battle,
and they were seldom used throughout the war. Gas masks
easily filtered these different smokes. sa
Skin irrj-tants cause the most evident physical damage
among all of the different chemical weapons. Wit'h the
exception of the lung irritant weapons, the skin irrltants
were t.he most effective chemical weapons used during the
war.ss The mosL Common and most devastating of these skin
irritant. weapons was mustard gas. Mustard gas was
considered by many to be the mosL effective of all chemj-cal
weapons used during the war. Many called mustard gas the
..king', of all the chemieal weapons.tt It was consi-dered Lo
be the king of the weapons because it affected almost every
53 Bradley, pp. 85.
t'H.L. Citcrest, "section I, Organization and Administration of Gas Defense," The Medical Department
Of the United States Army in the World War, Medical Aspects of Gas Warfare, vol. 14, (Washington
D. C. : Government Printing Offi ce, 1926), pp. 62.
s5 Bradley, pp. 85
'u H"tt"r, Muior (P) Charles E, Leavenworth Papers No. l0; Chemical Warfare in World War I: the
American Experience. l9l7-1918, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1984, pp. 14'
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part of the body and caused disabling damage to the bodies
of the soldiers. The gas causes extensive blistering and
burns on the surface of the skin and demands immediate
medical attentj-on. It also effectj-ve}y destroyed many of
the other parts of the body. These different parts included
the eyes, nose, and lungs. The effects of the mustard gas
can also take up to Lwo or three days before affecting the
soldiers. It ls a very heavy gas and was very effective in
trench warfare. The reason for its name of mustard gas was
because of it sme11 and co1or.s7
Of al-I the different gases used in World War I,
mustard gas was continually the most feared among the
troops on bot.h sides of the war. Mustard gas, much like the
other irritants, attacked the moist parts of the body.
However, it was much more devastating because it affected
aIl- of the soldiers skin. The main concentrati-ons of the
burns were found in the moistest parts of t.he body. In many
cases it would cause massive damage to the underarms and
groin, along wit.h the eyes and lungs. s8
Unlike the other irritanLs, the gas mask offered
litt1e or no protection from musLard gas. Mustard gas was
very heawy and in many cases was almost an oily substance
s7 Mike Iavarone, Gas Warfare, "Trenches on the Web,"
(htto ://www.worldwar 1 . c om. arm006.html) ( I 997).
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when it came in contacL with t.he human body. Wherever the
oily substance came into contact with skin it would produce
massive burn-like blisters. The gas could stay in a very
confined area hours and even days after it was dispersed.
Many times during battle the gas would be fired and it
would not cause an immediate reaction. This meant the
soldiers might only have suspected they were being
bombarded with normaf artillery, and the gas would take
effect sometime later. when it finally t.ook effect the
troops could be overrun by the other army.
Bot.h sides had developed different gases for chemical
warfare, however many of the gases on both sides were the
same. The Germans developed most of the weapons used in the
war; the Allies took more of a defensive positj-on of
chemical warfare. The Germans developed t.he following
weapons:
-Benzyl Bromide (tearing agent)
-Dichlormethylether (tearing agent)
-Diphenychloroarsine (asphyxiating agent)
-xy1yI Bromide (tearing agent) se
The a11ies al-so developed their own chemical weapons
and gases:
-Cyanogen (Cyanide)
-Ethy1 Iodoacetate (British tearing agent) 60
sslavarone, pp. 7.
5e laverone, pp. 5
60 Iaverone, pp. 5
Both sides of the war also shared many of t.he same








Atl of these weapons were clearly devastating
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effected by them, theY also caused
troops because of the drawn out effects
of many of the gases. The troops were not the only ones
physically to those
massive fear in the
affected
affected.
by the gas. Animals and plant life were also
A New York Times article even depicts the dumping
of the gas ouL at sea.t'It was clear the different armies
using the weapons didn't understand the environmental
danger the weapons posed. Major (P) Charles E. He11er best
described the impact of the weapons during the war, "Of al-I
the weapons used during World War T, none stimulated public
revulsion more then poison gas..."53
6l Iaverone, pp. 5.
62 ..war Gas Dumped Far out At Sea," New York Times, 9 March 1919, Sec. A, Pg. 18, Col. 4.
u, Heller, Charles'E. MAJ (P), Leavenworth Papers: Chemical Warfare in World War I: The American
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The Chemical Companies durinq Wor1d War I and the
Question of Ethics
World War I was the dawn for many new different
technologies in warfare. These new technologies also
brought many different ethical questions about their use in
warfare. Along with the question of their use in battle the
implicaLions of war profiteering also contributed to the
growth of these new and more effective weapons. Unlike the
other new weapons of Lhe time, chemical weapons brought a
new terror that could not be touched or seen. The
physiological effects that I have discussed in previous
sections were not the only reason for the feeling of terror
among the troops. The threat of the efficiency of these
weapons was also a very real terror, the use of these
chemicals also separated the troops even more and in a
certain aspect dehumanized war even more then before. fn
the case of chemical weapons many of the chemicals brought
a distinct sme11, and in many instances these weapons were
unstoppable. Even though the A11ies first t.ook a defensive
stand on the production of chemical weapons it. was clear
after the battle at Ypres, offensive measures would have to
be taken.
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As f have il-lustrated, many of t.he chemicals used in
the war were new to the world, and most of them were
developed either for industrial or household purposes' Many
companies manufactured these chemicals, and when the war
began they began to manufacture t.he chemical weapons. up
until the United St,ates entered the war t,he armed forces
had no interest in manufacturing or using chemical
weapons.6n The news coming from the battles prior to the
involvement of the United States soured the idea of use of
chemical weapons by the Allied forces. When the United
States did enter t.he war, ignorance of not knowing how to
manufacture the weapons was quickly stripped away. The use
of the chemj-ca] weapons, first by the Germans, decided the
use of the chemical weapons by the Unit.ed States.6s The
early production of gas was publicized mainly as a
defensive measure, and the development of gas masks
coineided with t.he development of the weapons.
One of the main companies contrlbut ing to t,he
development of the new weapons was Dow chemical. Even
though this raised the profits and production for the
chemieal company the founder, Herbert Dow, stated, "IL was
* E.N. Brandt, Growth Company: Dow Chemicals First Centur.v. (East Lansing: Michigan University
Press, 1997), pp. 85.
65 Benedict Ciowell, The Armies of Industry. (New Haven: Yale University Press, l92l),pp. 152
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the worst thing I ever had to do."65 The ethical question
devastated Dow and t.he rest of his family. His chil-dren
remember their father feeling like he had to do his duty,
but never being at rest with the production of the war
gases. However, this was only the public stands by Dow.
Along with doing his dut.y the profits for his company
during the war were staggering, over 50 million do1Iars.
Even though this may have been a tough decision for Dow it
is clear he had the future of his company always on his
mind. After the war the company had grown over twice its
size from before the war, and expanded to a larger chemical
producer. sT
Dow's lifelong friend A.W. Smith received word in
October 191,7, from the director of the United States Bureau
of mines, that because of the introduction of chemical
weapons by t.he Germans, it was of national urgency to
develop it own knowledge of gas warfare. smith soon put
more then two thirds of his time into researching gas-
relat.ed equipment. However, he focused most of his
attention on the production of a more effective gas mask.
Dow company historian E.N. BrandL maintains that smith
was extremely concerned about. the ethical question of the
6 Brandt, pp. 85.
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chemical weapons on the allied troops, even though he was
making a 1ot of money. His own personal goal to develop the
most protective gas mask possible became one of his top
priorities. The two initial problems he faced were to make
non-fogging eyepieces and to find the most absorbent
materials to be put int.o the masks.6t Both SmiLh and Dow
were thrust into the chemical warfare program. At this
point the production of weapons was not made public, and it
was hidden for the duration of the war. Civil-ian personnel
did the initial research done for the chemical weapons
program, but they were quickly puL under military rules.6e
This civilj-an work force quickly grew and it was the
popular belief among them that their research would help
win the war.
Dow and Smith wenL in separat.e directions by t.he end
of the war. Smith moved on to developing other new military
technologies, and Dow coneentrated on t.he production of
chemical weapons. The different Learing agents made at the
Dow plant were sent to Lraining camps all over the United
States so the troops going over seas could be trained on
67 "Report of the Special Committee on Investigation of the Munitions Industry (The Nye Report), Us
Congrlss, Senate, 74e Congress, 2od sess., February 1936,- http://www.mtholyoke.edr.r/acad/inteVnve.html,
1998.
68 Brandt, pp. 86.
6e Brandt, pp. 86.
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using gas masks.70 After the introduction of mustard gas by
the Germans at Ypres in l-91-5, both Smith and Dow were
brought back together and met in Washington to work on the
problem of developlng the United Statesr own mustard gas in
late 19L5. Many of the French troops cal]ed mustard gas
"Yeprite" because of the battle at Ypres.71 The Al1ies
agreed that the Germans could not be left with the monopoly
of mustard gas.72 Most of the personnel affiliated with the
war considered mustard gas to be the "king" of the chemical
weapons." Soon after Lhe decislon was made Smith and Dow
went to work on a crash program of developing mustard gas.
The entire t.ime Dow was developing the different
chemical weapons, he afso Concentrated on the development
of new medical technologies. He then created the Dow
medical department located on the same grounds as the
chemical factory. Things were going well for Dow until an
acciden! at, the training facility happened, killing one
soldier because of exposure to gas from a faulty canister.Ta
One of the top officj-aIs at Dow was accused of i-ncompetence
because of the accident, and Dow himself went on an
70 Brandt, pp. 87.
" L.F. Haber, The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War, (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1986),pp.122.
72 Brandt, pp. 87.
" Churl., E. Heller, MAJ (P), Leavenworth Papers: Chemical Warfare in World War I: The American
Experience. 1917-1918. (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1984),pp.26.
7a Brandt, w.92.
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aggressive campaign to defend him. Even though his efforts
saved the official, the production of Mustard gas was moved
from Dow chemical- to a new plant designed by Smith.Ts
At this time much of the manufacturing of the chemical
weapons was also taking place at the Edgewood Arsenal in
Maryland. Edgewood itself produced between 20 and 30
percent of all the United States chemical weapons in L91B
and it was a government installation. The construction of
the plant finished in mid summer of L9L7. Many of the
different gases used in the war were produced at Edgewood;
it was not until the spring of 191-8 that the production of
mustard gas had started. At the peak of the production at
Edgewood the chemical- weapons personnel numbered 7,400
people.76 The Edgewood installation itself was enormous- It
consisted of 2l- miles of standard railroad track, and 15
miles of narrow gauge railroad track. The arsenal was also
near two waterways, because this was a crucial element in
the production of the chemicals, and there were 558
building on the grounds aL Edgewood. These buildings
incl-uded three field hospitals, one complete hospltal, and
a Y.W.C.A.77
75 Brandt, pp. 95.
76 Benedict Crowell, America's Munitions 1917-1918. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office,
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Soon after the Allied victory Dow assessed his
eompany. He was more then satisfied wlth the contribution
that his company made to the war effort, and he took
certain comfort from knowing he helped with the war. Dow's
wartime products varied and contributed to many different
departments. These departments included the ordinance
department, aircraft department, and the Na-y, along with
the Chemical Warfare Division." He was completely
Compensated after the war. Dow took most of the money made
from the war and took care of his employees by building
them new homes and communities. Dow felt an obligation to
do something good with the money earned from the war, and
it was clear he always fe1t. good about doing his part, buL
terrible about the part he had to play.
Even though Brandt does not include the financial
status of the Dow Company, during the war it should be said
that Dow made a l-ot of money from t.he production of the
chemical weapons and many profited from the death of the
soldiers at the hands of chemical weapons. However, Dow was
not the only case of a chemical company making huge profits
from chemieal weapons. Another company that took part in
the prod.uction of the different. chemical weapons was the Du
Pont Chemical ComPanY.
78 Brandt, pp. 96.
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World War I was caIled the "chemi-sts' war" and World
War If was calIed the "physicists' war. "7e For. example a New
york Times article eredited chemieal weapons with more
American deaths in France then grenades and missi1es.80 As a
result of the war many of Lhe chemical companies production
within America shot up. This was also going on in Britain'
From 1-913 to Lg2O the production of dyestuffs shot up from
4,oOO tons in 1913 to 22,500 tons in 1920.81 This
constituted a large portion of the materials needed to
produce chemj-ca1 weapons. In America the change in
production was even larger. Seven different firms in Lhe
united staLes went from producing 3,000 tons of dyes in
i.9t-3, to 29,OOO tons in L920.82 This production capit.alized
over 3 million do11ars, and many of the companies
strengthened tremendously during the time of World War I.
Du pont and A11ied chemlcal and Dye companies were the
two largest and produced the most for export. By 1920 the
production at the Du Pont chemical plant was almost four
times as large as j-t was before the war.83 Du PonL took a
different road then most of the other chemical producers
during the war. The other large producers were A11ied
7e Graham D. Taylor, Du Pont and the International Chemical Industry, (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1984),
pp.43.




Chemical and Dye in America, fmperial Chemical Industries
in Britain, and I.G. Farben in Germany. These went into the
further development of the existing chemicals of the time'
Du Pont's board of directors saw more profit in developing
new chemicals for the war.8n Du Pont earned huge war profits
and was the largest supplier of smokeless powder and high
explosives for Lhe AIIies during the war. It was cl-ear that
a 1ot of money was being made
York Times storY boasted about
from t.he chemicals, a New
how "Toxic War Gases" would
help the industry.ss
Du pont board of director, s took Lhe opporLunity of
the war to develop these new chemicals to ensure a
financial future for the company.E5 Another Du Pont
historian David A. Hounshell staLes that Du Pont saw the
decades around the war as the experj-mental era.87 fn 1913,
Du Pont shipped. 20,OOO tons of chemicals to Britain, valued
at over 9 million dollars, and made up B0 percent of Du
Pont,s total market. Britain was not ready for the amount
of chemical production the war calIed for, so they looked
to many outside countries to supply them.88 In 1918 Du Pont
83 Taylor, pp.44.
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went public that they were producing the chemical weapons.
The production of the different chemical weapons had to be
done very quickly, and new processes had to be developed to
produce the different weapons at a faster rate. This makes
it clear that Du Pont was very aware of the money being
made from the chemicals being sent over seas. Even Lhough
the chemicals were causingi massive suffering during the war
the producLion by Du Pont never dropped. Du Pont and other
chemical companies believed the speed up production was one
of the crowning achievements during the war.8e The
production advancement done by the Du PonL Company duri-ng
World War I laid the groundwork for the production and
d.evelopment of synLhetic rubber, synthetic fuels, and the
entire field of petrochemicals. e0
Du Pont's work and advancements during the war were
clearly only for financial- gain. Taylor points out that the
decisions made by Du Pont's board were strictly financial.
They never took Lhe effects of the weapons into account,
like the Dow chemical company did. Du Pont's reported gross
profits from 1-9L7-1918 equaled more then 599 millions
do11ars." This huge gain in company profit allowed the Du





the General Motors Corporation.e2 Du Pont's chemical
production during World War f made them one of the
strongest chemical producers in the worId, and established
them as a strong company super power. Hounshell states
t.hroughout his analysis of Du Pont that the money made from
the production of the chemi-cals solidified Du Pont as a
power in the chemical industrY.e3
The production of the chemical and other weapons by
the large companies during the war brought many questions
after the war was over. To answer some of these questions a
special committee was formed in the United States Senate.
The Committee was cafled the Nye committee, named after a
senator from North Dakota named Gerald Nye. Nye was the
chair of the committee, and it.s primary goal was to look at
the munitions industry during the war.en The commj-ttee
looked at the preparedness and elite mobilization practices
of the war. The investigation of the munitions industry
incl-uded, but was not limited to, the Sales, manufacturing,
exports and imports, and relevant legislation and
treaties.es The investigation took place during the spring
of Lg26. Koistenunen states that the Nye committee reports
e2 Taylor,Tl.
e3 Taylor, 73.
'n paul A.C. Koistinsn, Plarudng War. Pursuing Peace: The Political Economy of American Warfare.
lg2}-1939. (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998), pp.253.
" Koistiner, pp.254.
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stand alone on the interwar studies of the economics of
modern warfare. Since the Nye committees' analysig many
scholars have questioned the results because of the
intemperance of Nye himself.e6
The Nye commi_ttee inquiries can be broken up into
three separate secLions. The first was the web of business,
governmental, and extra governmental ties at home and
abroad for the munitions industry. The second dealt with
the role of different American financial houses, including
J.p. Morgan & Company. The third was the secreLary of warrs
plans for mobil-ization and the actual mobilization.eT
The findings of the Nye committee were not good for
the munitions companies, including Du Pont.eB The findings
suggested the companies underminded peace by working
against. disarmament, arms control, and arms embargos." They
also found that Du Pont, with several other companies,
conspired to share patents, divided markets and profit
poo1s, circumvent embargos, and oppose arms control
measures.lo0 They broke many different laws to make a huge
amounL of profits during the war. Other crimes commltted by
* Koistinen, pp.254.
e7 Koistinen, pp.256.
e8 ..Report of the Special Committee on Investigation of the Munitions Industry (The Nye Report), Us





the companies found by the Nye committee included, 9uD
running by selling i11ega11y through intermediaries, and
falsifying documents . 101
It was clear from the Nye committee findings that
munitions companies like Du Pont made a tremendous amount
of money from the war, and ignored any moral or ethical
obligations that have to do with weapons production. fn the
month of October L9L7 over 24 t,housand Americans died due
to exposure to chemical weapons.'o' Beyond the questions
associated with money it was clear the different chemical
producers were also not concerned with the suffering their
products caused in the war. Many of the board members at' Du
pont justified the production of the weapons by st.ating
they were helping the war effort.-
As stated earlier much of the public was kept in the
dark about the chemical product.ion, and there was not more
American opposition to the weapons because the war was
being fought far from Amerlca. ff the war had been fought
closer to the United States there would have been protests
concerning the production of chemical because the public
would have been able to see the immediate effects of the
weapons. It also may have changed the ideals of the
ror Koistinen, pp.257
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decision makers at the chemical companies because the
soldiers being effected by their weapons would not have
been a half a world away. Throughout the course of the war
over 70 thousand Americans died because chemical weapons.to'
Unfortunately this ethical question of chemical warfare was
not raised until after the war had ended.
'o'H.L. Gilcrest, "section I, Organization and Administration of Gas Defense," The Medical DeparEnent
Of the United States Army in the World War, Medical Aspects of Gas Warfare, vol. 14. (Washington
D. C. : Government Printing Offi ce, 1926), pp. 27 3 .
lo3 Gilcrest, 273.
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Gas Maeks and other Gas Defense Eqtripment,
when chemical- weapons were introduced to the war many
questions arose about the effects the weapons would have on
combatants. The gas mask was first developed because of the
concern of the men working with the gas' Many of the
ethical questions were raised because of the chemical
weapons and as I have mentioned in earlj-er sections, there
was tremendous work on perfecting a gas mask for the A11ied
troops. The stand by the A11ies at t.he beginning of the war
was mainly defensive and the gas mask was a direct result
of the defensive measures taken. The gas mask also
constituted a change in Lhe tactics of chemical warfare'
skin agents, like mustard 9ds, were also used widely after
the development of the gas mask.'on The gas mask was the
most effect.j-ve way for the troops to prot.ect themselves
against the new chemical agents. The gas masks also allowed
the troops working around the weapons to work in a safer
environment.
The different tlpes of canisters used to hold the
weapons were not
the soldiers very
safe and very dangerous. This made many of
reluctant to work around the chemicals'
Another reason for the development of the gas masks was to
take a defensive approach t.o the chemical warfare. Many of
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the different countries involved in the war had problems
fighting using the gas. The first ones to use the gas were
the Germans at the battle of Ypres. The UniLed States and
the A11ies took more of a reserved approach, which included
more intensive development on the gas mask. It took until
al-most the end of the war before the first effective
version of the gas mask was deve1oped.10s
During the summer of L91-7 the news from the front
was one of wonder about. chemical weapons. The French and
British governments controlled what. news was printed in the
papers. However t.he UniLed St.ates newspapers were much more
liberal and sent back more uncensored news from the front.
Both the British and the French were worried and scared
about the picture being paint.ed about chemical warfare for
the public. The American troops on their way to war were
we1I aware of the reality of chemical warfare.'ot After
secret chemicals and experiments were made public in
technical journals the true news of chemical warfare was
more abundant.
The testing that was going on was also made public.
These tests included the effect.s of the war gases had on
animal-s, such as birds, dogs, caLs, and horses, and how
rM Martin Gilbert, The First World War. (New York: Holt and Company, 1994),p994.
'o'Gilbert, pp.95.
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different masks coul-d help the animals survive or not be
affected. Horse gas
protect the calvarY
arLicle that was in
masks were developed during the war to
during gas attacks.to' For instance an
the New York Times was titled "Gas
Killed 756 Americans", and it was very open about the men
t.hat were being killed by the gas. Even though most of t.he
articles were on the back pages of the front section, it
stilI was not hidden from the American public. A sub
heading that says, *Average age of our soldiers who died in
France was 23 years oId" follows the top headittg.'ot
This news coming back from the front contributed to
the concentration on gas defense equipment development. The
production of gas masks in America began in L9L7. The
United States turned out 5,250, OO0 gas masks considered to
be the besL in t.he world.to'ouL of all the gas masks
produced before the armistice over 4 milIj-on of them went
overgeas. The gas masks t.hat. were sent were not only for
the American forces, buL all of the A]lies as weII. Al-most
every oLher count.ry within the A11led forces put a Iot of
effort in perfecting t.he gas mask.1'0 The gas mask was not
t6 Benedict Crowell, America's Munitions 1917-1918. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1919),410.
lo' Mik. Ivarone, ,The Second Battle of Ypres, Apr-1915, "Trenches on the Web,"
HT - worldwarl . com. arm005 . h (tee7)
"Gas Killed 756 Americans," NeJLygILIiIlqg!, August
loe Crowell, 410
llo Crowell, 4l I
6, 1919, sec. A, pp. 9
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only to protect the Allied t.roops from gas attacks, but
also protect the troops from the gas when it was being
deployed. The different A11ied military powers felt it
would be more effective to have the troops protected from
the gas and it would give them an advantage over the German
troops.111
The Germans put litt1e concentration into the
protecLion devices and the American gas masks were
considered t.o be over 20 t.imes betLer then the German
masks.tt' There was never a reported case of an American
soldier dying due to an American gas mask failing. The job
of developing Lhe masks for the American troops was given
to the Surgeon General of the United States' The
development of the gas mask came a long way from its
The earliest forms of gasbeginnings by the end of the war-
masks were simply wet towels placed over the heads of the
soldiers. Another early form was cotton and wool wrapped
around the soldiers' faces. This also brought on many other
types of screens used for protection against the gas
weapons.tt' In later development many different tlpes of
designs were test.ed to find out. which was the most
"' L.F. Haber, The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War. (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1986), pp. 102.
l12 Crowell, 4l l.
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effective to protect the soldiers. The designs had many
different aspects to them, some were like hoods, and other
only covered the mouths of the soldiers. Many of the first
gas masks had separate respirators, which hung around the
necks of the troops."n These masks had eleven mai-n parts
that consisted of knap sacks, rubber hoses, face and
mouthpieces, and an elastic strap to hold the sack tightly
around the soldiers' head. Different scientists working on
the development. decided that the separation of the mask and
the respirator box was not
protect the soldiers. The
the most effective waY to










of the gas mask was done through
the American and British governmenLs.
Germans, spent very litt1e time on
concentrating more on offensive
warfare. One of the biggest problems
masks was the quantity needed.116 The
scientists developing Lhe masks also were laying the
foundation for later versions of the masks, however this
caused the problem of developing new teehnology and worki-ng
r13 Donald Richter, Chemical Soldiers: British Gas Warfare in World War I. (London: Leo Cooper, 1994),
pp,1l.




through many mistakes. The gas masks were first model-ed
after the British sma1l pox masks that were not, very
effective.'17 The sma11 pox masks were mainly designed to
protect the doctors and nurses from direct contact with the
airborne diseases, however they were not made to filter out
toxic chemicals in the air. Many of the chemicals t.hat were
being produced for t.he chemical weapons were also very
acidic and the masks could not filter them out because of
their heawy moisture."t These first sma1l pox masks laid
the much-needed groundwork for the later masks.
The perfect mask was considered the one that
completely eliminat.ed aI1 effects of the chemicals to the
soldier's eyes, nose, and face. Fitting the different.
components in a manner that was truly effective also proved
to be a problem. The eyepieces offered one of these
problerns. Designers had to find a substance that was
transparent, but extremely durable. A substance called
triplex glass was decided on to be used for the eyepieces
of the gas masks because it met the different requirements
that were necessary."' Sealing the different parts of the
"'Ivarone, "Trenches on the Web", Chemical Warfare.ll8Capt'PaulJ.Hanzlik,..SectionIIIExperimentalResearch,',
States Armv in the World War, Medical Aspects of Gas Warfare, vol. 14, (Washington D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1926\, pp. 663.
lle Crowell,4l8.
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mask was a problem because they had to fit together tightly
to prevent air from passing through
The most prominent scientists of the time were at work
on the masks and they began to develop new, more effective
substances to go into the masks. Several different American
companies patented many of the new technologies. CrowelI
speculates that many new technologies came from t,his
productlon. As I
Smith who worked
stated in the previous sections, A.W
for
a 1ot of his efforts
the Dow Chemical Company also devoted
on developing a more perfect gas
the eyepieces may have started plast.icmask."oFor instance
companies on their way to production. Many of the companies
were also making a lot of money from the production of the
chemicals, one of the largest being Du Pont. Many of the
different substances were those people wouldn't think would
go into gas masks. For instance charcoal was used in the
respirator boxes, because charcoal was very absorbent with
certain gases like chl-orine, and phosgene, however because
of the different effects on the body from mustard gas t.he
masks proved to be useless.121 Perfecting the use of the
charcoal went through several different stages. Designers
l2o 
E.N. Brandt, pp. 87
l8 Crowell,4l6
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found that the densest carbon would be the most effective
for the gas masks. Another strange substance used in the
respirator boxes was nutshe1ls."2 The demand for the
different nutshells was so large the US government had to
go to other tropical countries to supply their needs. The
government also went to the public to help by savi-ng the
different shefl-s and pits for production.l23
Even though there was never a reported case of an
American death due to a faulty gas mask that does not mean
t.here were no problems with the masks. There were times
when gas masks were senL to the front. and they had to be
sent back because there were defects in them. A New York
Times art j-cIe recounLed an instance of this during L9L8.L24
The article illustrates how several thousand gas masks sent
abroad were defective and had to be sent back to the United
States to be tested and repaired. This article also shows
that there was a Iot not known about the chemicals and many
were afraid the American troops had bad safety equipment.
Another insLance when masks had to be sent back was in late
1918 when several thousand masks had to be sent back for a
breathing mechanism defect. The soldiers were being




..Says Gas Masks Sent Abroad Are Useless," New York Times, 19 January, 1918, pp. 20.
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air to pass through, and the soldiers had to remove the
mask to breath.l2s
Another concern from gas warfare was for the animals
used during the war. For much of t.he war the use of horses
was very important, and Lhe gas affected animals like
humans. Horses were still wideJ-y used because the
automobile was a new technology and the tank had nowhere
near the effectiveness of later designs. The end of the war
had changed the design of the early tank and it proved to
be more effecti-ve, however horses sti11 played an exLremely
important role in the war. Special gas masks were made for
the horses used in the war. Over three hundred thousand
horse gas masks were produced for the war.126
There were also many different tlpes of defense
equipment developed during the war. Special blankets were
developed t.o keep the different gases out of the dugouts
and foxholes. The blankets were treated with different
chemicals to repel the gas. DifferenL types of creams and
ointments were also developed during the war to aid the
soldiers from the chemical weapons. The most frequently
used ointment calIed Sag Paste was used over the last part
"5 Ivarone, "Trenches on the Web," Chemical Warfare.
"6 It4uio4n; Charles E. Heller, Leavenworth Papers No.10; Chemical Warfare in World War I: The
American Experience, 1917-1918. (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Combat Studies Institute, 1984),Pg'19
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of the war, and over Lwelve hundred Lons were shipped
overseas. 127
In the sources I have shown in this section, such as
Ivarone and Crowe1l, it is clear the gas mask made an
impact on the war both tactically and ethically. The gas
mask made it possibte for many l-ives to be saved from the
different war gases used. The defensive position taken by
the Allied forces was the main reason for the development
of the gas mask, and it is clear it was an ethical decision
to develop the gas mask. It is clear if t.he gas mask had not
been developed a much larger number of casualties would




In this paper, I have explored many of the different
aspects of chemical warfare during World War I through the
tactical changes and the ethical challenges of the war. In
researching for this project it, has become clear to me Lhat
chemicaL warfare had an impact on the war. Most of the
historians I have studied have agreed that chemical warfare
did not change the outcome of the war, but still played a
significant role in how the war was fought. Chemical
warfare had a profound impact on the troops fighting the
war. It is clear the men fighting the war were forever
changed by their exposure to the horror of chemical
weapons, and many of t.he producers of the weapons gained a
lot by its production and use. In all of the sources I have
looked at. it is clear chemical weapons made an impact on
multiple 1eve1s. A11 of the different nations in the war
took their own stance on chemical weapons some offensive
and some defensj-ve, but it was clear the positions changed
throughout the war. As I have illustrated throughout. this
paper the introduction of Lhe chemical weapons during the
war impacted many of the tactical decj-sions made by the
opposing sides.
The ethical questions raised by t.he use of the
chemical weapons have continued until today and have been
58
evident. in all the wars since. It could even be compared to
the most destructive force ever used in the Atomic bomb
The development of newer chemical weapons such as Napalm,
and deforesting agents has made it clear World War f
chemical weapons laid the groundwork for several other
weapons used in the wars since. Operation Ranch Hand in
Vietnam is a strong example of this. The issues about
chemical weapons sti11 seem to be as important today as
they were during the years of World War I. New medical
technologies have also displayed many of the after effects
of the weapons and it is clear many more ethical questions
have been raised in the decades since World War I
Both the tactical aspects and the ethical questions
were present at the time of the war and remained after t.he
war ended. There has never been a war fought like World War
I and I believe the chemical weapons developed during the
war are a large part of the reason why. The ethical
questions linked to them were asked by some, but not, by
many. As an evolving society one of the things that we have
to make decisions about is the limits of technology. We
must also ask, "If we can, should we?" It boggles my mind
that the worl-d was a dark enough place for such a horror to
be unleashed. My only hope is that the people not only in
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